Added: Jun 18, 2010
From: sammarlow77593
Duration: 10:21
The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from howitzers would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from 45mm, 57mm, and 85 mm towed anti-tank guns and 76.2mm divisional field guns would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German 9th Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometre of defended front. In the 6th and 7th Guards Army sectors in the south the density was lower, with about 10 guns per kilometre. The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometre of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometre and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometre. Red Army engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid barbed wire, built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Like the intended German deceptions, the Soviet deception plans were elaborate. Unlike the German plans, however, the Soviet ruses were generally successful. Dummy positions were constructed and dummy aircraft were placed on false airfields and false radio traffic sent to confuse German intelligence. Camouflaging of actual positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units had of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns was their own vehicles exploding. State of the Red Air Force: The Red Air Force (VVS) had lost over 36,900 aircraft in 1941-1942. The Soviet aircraft industry was able to replace losses in machines and had now rearmed, while dispensing with obsolete types such as the I-16, MiG-3 and the LaGG-3. The most widely used Soviet fighters in the Kursk battle were the Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5. The La 5FN was considered to be a match for both the Bf 109 and Fw 190. Pilot training was short and lacked thoroughness. The 13,383 Soviet pilots who were trained in 1942 received 13--15 flight hours before combat. Shturmovik and bomber pilots received just 18 and 15 hours respectively. Of the Soviet bomber and ground attack units, just seven percent of its pilots had seen action prior to Kursk. Most Soviet pilots were forced to train on the aircraft they would fly in combat. As a result the Soviets lost 10,600 aircraft to training accidents up until the summer of 1943. At senior command, the Soviets possessed highly skilled leaders such as Colonel General Aleksandr Novikov, Commander-in-Chief of the VVS in the Kursk region. A lack of experience at lower levels led to costly losses. In the aftermath of Kursk, Soviet aviation rapidly improved its coordination with ground forces. Its pilots also received a rapidly improving training program. As a result, the Soviets were able to build the Red Banner units of highly skilled fighter pilots. Just six months after Kursk, the ratio of Soviet to German aircraft losses had changed from 4:1 to 3:2.
Channel: Film
Tags: german panzer tiger battle sherman panther tank red army soviet union russia georgiy zhukov stalin kursk world war ii wwii ww2 erwin rommel patton churchill montgomery afrika korps wehrmacht heinz guderian hitler blitzkrieg field marshal erich von manstein day normandy invasion great britian england combat germany allies battleship ss soldier america american france hermann göring atlantic wall operation overlord resistance japan pearl harbor uk usa nazi holocaust
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